I.
In their classic work, The Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) deal with a number of critical public choice issues. One of the most basic of these issues is whether the decision-time costs associated with a rule of full unanimity are sufficiently high as to mandate the adoption of a 'relative unanimity' rule (a la Wicksell , 1896) . In his book, The Demand and Supply of Public Good s, Buchanan (1968: 95) observes what a rule of relative unanimity is meant to accomplish:
...so long as the individual knows in advance that his own vote, standing alone, cannot effectively block a proposal, he will not be motivated to exploit others for his own uniquely differential benefit. If a proposal is presented for a vote that embodies net benefits for him, he will tend to accept it, even if under a rule of full unanimity, he would be tempted to block the same issue. Under relative unanimity, it seems probable that a sufficient number of individuals would behave non-strategically to allow collective decisions on public goods to be reached.
The rule of relative unanimity has been criticized by a number of authors such as Fishkin (1979) and . Fishkin rejects rules of unanimity and near unanimity because such decision rules are likely to result in govern-mental inactions which impose "severe deprivations" or tyranny. "Severe deprivations that a regime fails to prevent can be as terrible as those it desires to impose" (Fishkin, 1979: 70) . Put somewhat differently, Fishkin (1979: 69) asserts that " the government's failure to act may subject (a citizen) to the will of others . . . whose actions the government fails to prevent. also rejects relative unanimity because 'we must surrender the right for other outcomes.' 1 These 'other outcomes' or foregone alternatives may be classified as (a) the set of decisions that might otherwise have been approved by a majority, and (b) the set of decisions that cannot be made because relative unanimity 'favors negative minorities over positive majorities' (Rae, : 1273 . The latter issue is consistent with the analysis in Fishkin (1979) .
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We are not concerned here with the former because any decision that achieves consensus or relative unanimity necessarily would achieve a majority and would be deemed superior on efficiency grounds. However, we are concerned with the decisions that are sacrificed because 'negative minorities' may be able to block efficient decisions. This paper formulates a simple mathematical framework for the selection of an "optimum relative unanimity" decision rule. The approach is first to identify the benefits of moving from a rule of simple majority towards a rule of full unanimity. Then, the costs of moving from simple majority rule towards unanimity are identified. Finally, the issue of an optimal decision rule is broached. This note seeks to help resolve the long-standing controversy/debate involving Buchanan and Tullock (1962) , Fishkin (1979) , Buchanan (1968) , , Tullock (1975) , Barry (1965) and others. The closing section of this note contrasts the present analysis with that originally presented by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) .
II.
We assume a group of n individuals. The group is a voluntary association of persons brought together for the purpose of satisfying their common needs. Dictatorship within the grou p is not permitted. All votes (which must be either 'yes' or 'no') have eq ual weight. Majority rule is the minimum feasible decision rule. A ballot in which x persons vote 'yes' (x < 1/2n) and in which an equal number of persons x vote 'no' th us could not result in a decision.
In simple majority voting schemes, especially in the 'large numbers' case, the fundamental problem one encounters is that of the 'free rider ,' who secures benefits of group action without sharing the costs thereof; here, decision-making tends to break down. U nder a rule of unanimity, the same individual is thrust into a 'small numbers' case, and the 'free rider' problem effectively disappears. As Buchanan (1968: 97) observes, if a '. . . rule of unanimity should be applied . . . public goods will tend to be supplied efficiently.' Thus, on the one hand, a rule of unanimity (unqualified) tends to generate maximum benefits to the grou p in terms of efficiency in the provision of public goods. On the other hand, this same rule of unanimity -in practical terms -very likely '. . . would result in new, if any; decisions being made' (Buchanan, 1968: 94) .
Thus, in moving from a rule of the simple majority towards various forms of relative unanimity and ultimatel y towards full unanimity, benefits accrue to the group in terms of increased efficiency in the provision of pu blic goods. Such benefits reach a maximum at full unanimity (Buchanan, 1968: Ch. 5) . One possible representation of these grou p benefits as the voting rule changes is show n in Figure 1 by the curve GB, which embraces the range of gross group benefits beyond simple majority. Observe that curve GB is at a minimum at the point of a simple majority rule, where, in terms of Figure 1 , the 'free rider' problem is greatest. 
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Note also that the curve reaches its maximum at the point of full unanimity, where the 'free rider' issue is dissolved.
In moving from a rule of simple majority towards a rule of full unanimity , there are increasing costs to the gr oup. In particular, as the voting rule rises above that of a simple majority , the probability of decisions being made diminishes. In the extremum of unanimity , any single negative vote blocks a proposal; th us, the probability of incremen tal decisions being made is minimized under unanimity. Our in terpretation here of 'group costs' is reasonably compatible with the analysis in and Fishkin (1979) where it is argued that there are costs to the grou p from consensus or near consensus in terms of government inaction or in terms of the outcomes that the group 'must surrender.' Since the objective of the group is the collective satisfaction of needs common to all members of the group, a decreased probability of a group decision is an increased cost to the grou p. Hence, as the voting rule rises above that of simple majority towards that of unanimity, group costs rise. In terms of Figure 1 , these costs rise as we move from simple majority in the direction of unanimity.
If group costs rise at an increasing rate as the voting rule rises above simple majority in the direction of unanimity, the costs to the group can be ted by a curve such as GC in Figure 1 . Clearly, so long as grou p benefits and group costs are both measured in common terms, there exists a point of maximum net benefits from a voting scheme lying between the simple majority and unanimity -an optimum relative unanimity. This is represented in Figure 1 by R*, where R * represents that percentage of votes in excess of majority which maximizes net benefits to the gr oup.
Mathematically , so long as group costs and group benefits can be expressed in common terms, the group can be viewed as seeking to maximize:
where R = N = GB = GC = the percentage of the group whose positive votes are necessary to a decision for the group; net benefits from the various alternative values of R; group benefits (gross) for the various alternative values of R; group costs (gross) for the various alternative val ues of R.
For N to be a maximum, it is necessary that or that
GB'(R) = GC'(R)
Eq uation (3) states that the slopes of the curves GB and GC in Figure 1must be equal for group net benefits to be achieved. Such a situation is represented in Figure 1 at R = R* -at the optimum relative unanimity. As shown in Figure 1 , the slope of the GC curve is rising, i.e. GC"(R) > O. It is Possible also that GC"(R) < 0. In the case where GC" = 0, the optimum relative unanimity falls out in a very straightforward fashion, much as in Figure 1 . This can be easily verified by the reader.
If the GC curve should rise at a decreasing rate, i.e., if GC"(R) < 0, then at least two interesting possibilities appear. On the one hand, such a GC curve might be everywhere steeper than the GB curve, as shown in Figure 2 . In this type of case, the 'optimum' occurs at the point of simple majority, where the negative net benefits are minimized. This essentially is the case developed by and is similar to the case in Fishkin (1979) . If this particular representation is valid, then Rae's arguments rejecting unanimity are also valid. However, it is clear that Rae's arguments may be only a special case of the more general Buchanan-Tullock (1962) framework. On the other hand, the GC curve might be everywhere flatter than the GB curve, as illustrated in Figure 3 . In this type of case, N is maximized at full unanimity. In this latter case, full unanimity is the optimal group solution, and it is unnecessary to resort to relative unanimity (Wicksell, 1896; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962 or to 'autocracy' as suggested in Rae, : 1294 . However, as was the situation in Figure 2 , Figure 3 may also be only a special case.
III
It may be arguable that the GC curve illustrated in Figure 1 is the most reasonable. This argument might be predicated upon the idea that, as the value of R rises above a simple majority r ule, each individual in the group begins to recognize a growing individual power. This power is an increasing function of R. Thus, as R rises, the likelihood of a decision may decline at a faster and faster rate. If so, then GC"(R) > 0, and the optimum relative unanimity falls out readily, as in Figure 1 .
In closing, we note that this analysis differs in several important respects from that in Buchanan and Tullock (1962) . Relating this analysis to a some-what similar appearing one in Buchanan and Tullock (1962) , we refer to their Figure 7 (p. 86). There are, of course, the obvious differences, such as (1) our use of percentage of the group required for a decision and Buchanan and Tullock's use of the number of persons required to agree, and (2) our use of simple majority as the minimum required for decision-making and Buchanan and Tullock's use of zero plus one as the minimum number required. More importantly, however , our analysis differs from theirs in its definition of the 'cost' schedule. Buchanan and Tullock's cost schedule is a 'decision -making' cost, i.e., it represents the expected cost to the individual of agreeing on a decision in terms of '. . . time and effort . . . which is required to secure agreements' (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962: 86) . Costs as defined in the present paper are different. In this paper, they represent costs to the group in terms of a diminished probability of any decisions being made. Clearly, the notions are similar, but not identical. In addition, the present paper considers cases where costs do not rise at an increasing rate and provides a basis for viewing the Fishkin-Rae analysis as a special case. Finally, Buchanan and Tullock speak of a schedule of 'net' benefit s to the individual, whereas the present paper speaks in terms of 'gross' benefits to the group.
